A Catastrophic Conundrum, But Not a Nuisance: Why the Judicial Branch is Ill-Suited to Set Emissions Restrictions on Domestic Energy Producers Through the Common Law Nuisance Doctrine by Hall, Matthew
Chapman Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 2
2010
A Catastrophic Conundrum, But Not a Nuisance:
Why the Judicial Branch is Ill-Suited to Set
Emissions Restrictions on Domestic Energy
Producers Through the Common Law Nuisance
Doctrine
Matthew Hall
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew Hall, A Catastrophic Conundrum, But Not a Nuisance: Why the Judicial Branch is Ill-Suited to Set Emissions Restrictions on
Domestic Energy Producers Through the Common Law Nuisance Doctrine, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 265 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol13/iss2/2
Do Not Delete 4/14/2010 5:42 PM 
265 
A Catastrophic Conundrum, But Not a 
Nuisance:  Why the Judicial Branch is  
Ill-Suited to Set Emissions Restrictions on 
Domestic Energy Producers Through the 
Common Law Nuisance Doctrine 
Matthew Hall* 
Touted as a landmark decision reviving a legal theory once 
essentially left for dead, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently reversed a district court order dismissing a lawsuit 
brought by eight states, New York City and several private land 
trusts against six major energy producers, alleging that the energy 
producers’ carbon dioxide emissions constituted an actionable 
nuisance.1  In its opinion, the court suggested that the judicial 
branch can set limits on carbon dioxide emissions of such 
producers without legislative action under the federal common 
law nuisance doctrine.2 
The harmful nature of greenhouse gases is approaching a 
point of being scientifically beyond dispute and dramatic action 
needs to be taken to prevent calamitous consequences.  However, 
this article will argue that any determination of precisely how 
such harmful pollutants should be regulated is beyond the reach 
of the judicial branch through the common law doctrine of 
nuisance, and must come instead from the elected officials of the 
coordinate branches of government. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the Second Circuit’s 
decision cannot be of use in the battle against global warming.  
The threat of emissions caps created by the judiciary through 
piecemeal litigation could be precisely the motivation that 
Congress—and the energy lobby—needs to enact uniform, 
widespread emissions reduction policies. 
* Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, Denver, CO.  J.D. (2007), Loyola 
Law School, Los Angeles. 
1 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
2 Id. at 315. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Persistent Congressional and Executive inaction in 
regulating harmful carbon dioxide emissions, particularly from 
energy producers, has forced the hand of the judicial branch.  
Many countries agree that something needs to be done soon, in 
order to mitigate the potentially calamitous consequences of 
global climate change. 3   However, widespread regulation of 
harmful emissions requires the setting of policy—specifically, a 
determination of how the United States should value global 
environmental interests relative to its own economic interests.  
The courts of this country are not the appropriate forum in which 
to resolve these complex policy issues. 
In an attempt to achieve what Congress and the President 
have not been able to, the concept of suing large emitters of 
carbon dioxide under the common law nuisance doctrine was 
contemplated several years ago.4  After an outright defeat of this 
strategy at the district court level in the Second Circuit in 2005 
on grounds that the political question doctrine prohibited the 
courts from intervening in the global warming debate at this 
juncture,5 the nuisance route seemed untenable.  However, with 
a single decision, the Second Circuit revived the nuisance 
doctrine as a potentially viable means for addressing climate 
change.6 
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., the Second 
Circuit held that courts are not precluded by the political 
question doctrine from granting injunctive relief, including 
potentially setting specific emissions restrictions on domestic 
emitters of carbon dioxide, to plaintiffs claiming damages caused 
by global warming.7  The court reasoned that, because its holding 
was limited to the six energy producing entities identified as 
defendants in the lawsuit, it was not engaged in setting any sort 
of national policy on emissions reductions.8 
While reasonable minds agree that action must be taken on 
climate change, taking such action via the common law nuisance 
doctrine presents serious problems, both under Article III 
standing and the political question doctrine. 
 3 Richard Black, 55 countries send UN their carbon-curbing plans, BBC NEWS, Feb. 
1, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8492450.stm. 
 4 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 5 Id. at 265, 267. 
 6 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 315. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 325. 
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In order to have standing, a plaintiff must bring grievances 
before a court which could be redressed through an order of that 
court.9  Unlike previous environmental disputes adjudicated by 
the courts involving pollution from a specific source damaging a 
particular river or airspace, 10  global warming is a worldwide 
issue with countless contributors. 11   Simply limiting the 
emissions of six domestic energy companies, as the Second 
Circuit has seemingly allowed for, 12  is extremely unlikely to 
redress any harm caused by global warming.  Instead, a 
comprehensive, international policy is needed to curb the tide of 
human-induced climate change. 
However, the judicial branch cannot be the body which sets 
any sort of broad based policy on global warming.  To begin with, 
it can be argued that Congress has already spoken on the 
appropriate timing for the implementation of any emissions 
restrictions on domestic energy producers. 13   Both houses of 
Congress separately urged that no emissions restrictions be 
agreed to absent a comprehensive global agreement by which 
other nations, including developing countries, agree to reduce 
their own emissions accordingly.14  The theory behind such a 
policy would be that enacting domestic restrictions prior to 
completing negotiations on a global agreement would reduce the 
President’s bargaining power in seeking emission reduction 
concessions from other nations.  Congress likewise enacted 
legislation prohibiting domestic enforcement of the Kyoto 
Protocol on the grounds that it does not require developing 
nations to reduce their emissions.15  If Congress has announced a 
policy of refraining from restricting domestic emissions absent a 
global agreement, any decision from the judiciary in 
contravention of this policy would be prohibited by the political 
question doctrine.16 
Even if Congress has yet to announce an official policy 
stance, the judicial branch would run afoul of the political 
 9 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 10 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 
206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 11 See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
STATISTICS, 2006 TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY 
(2006), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (showing carbon dioxide emissions from recognized nations 
throughout the world). 
 12 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314–15. 
 13 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992); S. Res. 98, 105th 
Cong. (1997). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp.2d 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 16 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  See also discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
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question doctrine should it attempt to set a broad based 
emissions reduction policy.  The political question doctrine 
prohibits the judicial branch from issuing decisions which would 
require an “initial policy determination” of a kind not ordinarily 
made by the courts.17  In order to create carbon dioxide emission 
restrictions, the judicial branch would be charged with making 
numerous value-based policy decisions.18  These policy decisions 
would include whether the United States, as a nation, should 
commit to emissions restrictions for energy producers before a 
global accord is reached, and if so, the court would be required to 
weigh domestic economic interests against the need for emissions 
reductions to determine the appropriate schedule and degree of 
the required reductions.19  In fact, the inordinate policy setting 
that would be required by a court in this context would exceed 
even those decisions made by courts widely accused of 
demonstrating unrestrained judicial activism—the New Deal era 
court and the Warren Court. 20   Through comparison to the 
“activist” decisions of these courts, it becomes apparent that 
judicial creation and implementation of emissions restrictions for 
domestic energy producers would be extraordinary action for the 
judicial branch to undertake. 
In short, the judicial branch is faced with a conundrum in its 
attempts to set emission standards: if it attempts to set 
widespread policy, it runs afoul of the political question doctrine, 
but it if tries to narrowly tailor emissions restrictions to a given 
defendant, the impact of the decision would be so slight on the 
consequences of global warming that the redressability prong of 
traditional Article III standing analysis cannot be met.  As such, 
the only appropriate means by which to regulate carbon dioxide 
or other greenhouse gas emissions is through the other 
coordinate branches of government. 
However, despite the fact that cases using the nuisance 
doctrine to set emissions policies may not be legally sound and 
may not survive the scrutiny of the Supreme Court, they can still 
serve a useful role in encouraging the legislative and executive 
branches to take action in order to prevent piecemeal carbon 
dioxide emission regulations at the hands of the judicial branch.  
In fact, this may have been the subtle intention of the Second 
Circuit in issuing its recent decision in Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power Co.21 
 17 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 18 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272–73.  See also infra Part II.B.2. 
 19 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 20 See PETER WOLL, PUBLIC POLICY 223–29 (1974). 
 21 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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Part I of this article sets forth the Second Circuit’s reasoning 
in reaching its decision, specifically focusing on the types of 
environmental disputes that the court cites as evidence that 
nuisance is an appropriate means for resolving this case.  The 
majority of the authorities cited by the court involve specific acts 
of pollution contained in a finite geographical area which, on 
their own, provably caused or were sufficiently likely to cause 
harm to the plaintiff. 
Part II discusses the critical differences between the nature 
of the previous environmental disputes successfully resolved by 
courts and cited by the American Electric Power Co. Court and 
the present dispute involving carbon dioxide emissions which 
place carbon dioxide emission standards in the realm of non-
justiciable political questions.  Rather than specific and 
geographically finite acts of pollution that result in readily 
attributable harm subject to redressability, harmful carbon 
dioxide emissions are a worldwide problem requiring a global (or 
at least national) solution.  This posits an unsolvable conundrum 
for the courts.  The political question doctrine precludes the 
judicial branch from imposing emission restrictions that are 
sufficiently widespread to result in meaningful reductions or 
postponements of the consequences of global warming, but 
anything short of meaningful reductions or postponements 
prevents litigants claiming injuries under nuisance laws from 
having standing to assert their claims. 
Part III argues that even though the reasoning in this 
opinion should not withstand further scrutiny, it can still serve 
an important purpose in encouraging the legislative branch to act 
in setting emission restriction policies.  Perhaps this was in fact 
the primary intent of the Second Circuit in issuing its decision 
after acknowledging that global warming is a serious problem 
that requires prompt and unified action. 
I.  THE REVIVAL OF THE COMMON LAW NUISANCE DOCTRINE IN 
THE GLOBAL WARMING DEBATE:  CONNECTICUT V. AMERICAN 
ELECTRIC POWER CO. 
On September 21, 2009, more than three years after 
argument, the Second Circuit issued its decision in Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co.22  Plaintiffs—eight states, New York 
 22 582 F.3d 309.  Interestingly, a rare two-judge panel of the Second Circuit issued 
the decision.  The case was originally assigned to the two deciding judges, along with 
Justice (then Judge) Sonia Sotomayor.  Justice Sotomayor was promoted to the United 
States Supreme Court before this case was decided, making her unable to participate in 
the decision.  Since the two remaining judges agreed on the result, the decision was 
issued by the two remaining judges rather than be reassigned to a new panel. Id. at 314.  
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City and three private land trusts—sued six major electric power 
companies which operate fossil-fuel-fire power plants in twenty 
states, alleging that the defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions 
constituted a nuisance in that they contributed to global 
warming and its harmful effects.23   Plaintiffs’ objective in 
bringing the suit was to force the defendants to “cap and then 
reduce their carbon dioxide emissions,” which Plaintiffs alleged 
were causing damages to their interests.24  Plaintiffs identified 
both present and future harms attributable to global warming, 
including the reduction of snow mass in California (and 
corresponding reduction in water for the State), respiratory 
problems for residents, beach erosion and coastal flooding.25  The 
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s determination that 
the political question doctrine serves as a bar to judicial 
resolution of the lawsuit, and further held that Plaintiffs had 
sufficiently demonstrated standing to pursue their nuisance 
claims.26 
A. The Second Circuit’s Political Question Doctrine Analysis 
In analyzing the application of the political question doctrine 
to this case, the Second Circuit turned to the six factors set forth 
in Baker v. Carr: 
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.27 
Some pundits have speculated that the case, which was decided by the District Court in 
2005, was purposefully delayed until after Sotomayor’s promotion to the Supreme Court 
to make her confirmation an easier process. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Questions Arise About 
Long Delay by Sotomayor-Led Panel in Climate Case, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 
29, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431051311. 
 23 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 310, 314. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 317–18. 
 26 Id. at 315.  The court further held that Plaintiffs’ claims were not displaced by 
existing federal law. Id.  While this holding may present its own issues, they are outside 
the scope of this article. 
 27 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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After noting that Baker “set a high bar for nonjusticiability,” the 
court explained why each Baker factor is inapplicable to the 
issues presented.28 
The first factor, a textual constitutional commitment to a 
coordinate political department, was quickly dismissed as an 
untenable argument by the court.29  Defendants argued that the 
first factor was applicable based on the commerce clause and 
executive powers.30  As to the commerce clause, the court declined 
to consider the argument as it was “insufficiently argued” and 
thereby waived.31  As to executive powers, defendants argued 
that judicial intervention would usurp the executive’s authority 
to “resolve fundamental [global] policy questions,” thereby 
impermissibly interfering with the executive’s right to manage 
foreign relations.32  The court rejected this argument, holding 
that Plaintiffs sought only to limit the emissions from six energy 
producers, not set global policy on climate change.33 
The second factor, a lack of judicially-discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving the case, was likewise clearly 
rejected by the court.34  Defendants argued that the uncertainties 
surrounding the impact of greenhouse gases render judicial 
intervention, particularly in the form of setting emission 
standards, unmanageable. 35   The court responded to this 
argument by noting that “federal courts have successfully 
adjudicated complex common law nuisance cases for over a 
century.”36  For instance, the court cited cases in which courts 
reached the merits: Missouri sued to prevent Illinois from 
dumping sewage into a channel that emptied into the Missouri 
River above St. Louis;37  Georgia sued to stop a Tennessee 
company’s “noxious emissions” from continuing to harm Georgian 
forests and crops;38 and New Jersey sued to prevent New York 
City from dumping trash into the ocean, causing New Jersey 
waters and beaches to become polluted.39  These disputes, the 
court reasoned, required judicial determinations of complex 
scientific issues as to the harm or prospective harm caused by 
 28 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 321–32. 
 29 Id. at 324–25. 
 30 Id. at 324. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 325. 
 34 Id. at 326–29. 
 35 Id. at 326. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)). 
 38 Id. at 327 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Georgia v. 
Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915)). 
 39 Id. (citing New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)). 
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purported environmental pollutants.40  Just as those courts were 
able to wade through the complexities to make reasoned 
decisions, so too, concluded the court, could it do with respect to 
carbon dioxide emissions.41 
As to the third Baker factor, the impossibility of deciding the 
case without an “initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion,” defendants argued, and the District 
Court agreed, that the “very nature of [global warming] requires 
a comprehensive response” which specifically requires the 
decision of whether to adopt a policy limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions. 42   Defendants further argued that Congress has 
contemplated such limits, calling for further study of the 
propriety of such action, but to date has refrained from enacting 
any specific policy.43  According to defendants and the District 
Court, the judicial branch cannot act without this initial policy 
determination from the legislative branch.44  The court minimized 
the importance of Congress’ “refusal to legislate,” citing Illinois v. 
City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I)45 for the proposition that, where 
a gap exists in a federal regulatory scheme, common law exists to 
fill those gaps.46 
Milwaukee I specifically dealt with a water pollution 
abatement remedy sought by the State of Illinois not expressly 
covered by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or any other 
federal environmental statutes.47  The Milwaukee I Court, like 
Plaintiffs in this case, turned to federal common law nuisance to 
authorize the remedy sought.48  The court further noted that a 
plaintiff should not be required to wait until comprehensive 
legislation has been enacted covering the specific grievance 
alleged.49  Further, the court stated that ordinary tort suits do 
not require any initial policy determination that would be 
problematic under Baker, and that this nuisance action was 
consistent with an ordinary tort suit.50 
 40 Id. at 327. 
 41 Id. at 328–29. 
 42 Id. at 330; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 43 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 330. 
 44 Id. at 331. 
 45 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
 46 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 330. 
 47 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103–04. 
 48 Id. at 107. 
 49 Id. at 101–04; Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331. 
 50 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331 (citing McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 
Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
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Finally, the court lumped the discussion of the fourth, fifth 
and sixth Baker factors together, deciding that all three factors 
are premised on some existing policy which might lead to 
uncertainty or inconsistent results.51  The court held that there is 
no unified United States policy on greenhouse gas emissions.52  
While recognizing the “political overtones” of issues concerning 
global warming, because there is no identifiable policy that would 
be violated or contradicted by a decision from the judicial branch, 
the court ultimately concluded that these Baker factors likewise 
were not implicated.53 
B. The Second Circuit’s Standing Analysis 
Despite the fact that the court held that its decision was not 
creating any national or global policy and was limited solely to 
the twelve plaintiffs and six defendants, the court nonetheless 
found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated standing 
to pursue their nuisance claims.54 
The court began its standing analysis by questioning 
whether the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA55 eliminated the need for traditional Article III standing 
requirements (injury in fact, causation and redressability) when 
a State sues as parens patriae—that is, on behalf of its injured 
citizens.56  Concluding that the matter was an open question, the 
court proceeded to analyze standing in this case under both the 
parens patriae approach and the standard Article III 
formulations. 57   Of particular interest to this article is the 
traditional Article III standing issue, and most importantly, the 
issue of redressability.58 
 51 Id. at 331–32. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 332. 
 54 Id. at 314–15. 
 55 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 56 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 336–37. 
 57 Id. at 338–39. 
 58 While the Second Circuit described the state of the law regarding whether 
traditional Article III standing analysis is required for states suing as parens patriae as 
an open question, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), 
found it necessary to apply the traditional elements of injury in fact, causation and 
redressability in spite of any analysis under a parens patriae theory.  Moreover, the 
article cited by the Am. Electric Power Co. Court in its opinion, Bradford Mank, Should 
States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?:  Massachusetts v. EPA’s 
New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008), concludes that the 
parens patriae analysis provides for a slackened application of the traditional elements, 
but applies them nonetheless.  Although outside the subject of this paper, this author 
would posit that the parens patriae analysis takes the place of the “injury in fact” prong of 
the traditional analysis, leaving the remainder of the traditional analysis in tact.  In any 
event, the Second Circuit held that the private land trust plaintiffs, who do not fit under 
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As the court noted, a showing of redressability requires “a 
substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the 
alleged injury in fact.” 59   Defendants essentially argued that 
because they contribute such a small amount on a global scale to 
the causes of global warming, alleged to be “2.5% of man-made 
carbon dioxide emissions,” capping their emissions would not 
prevent or reduce the harm and future harm alleged by 
Plaintiffs. 60   The Court summarily rejected this argument, 
stating that Massachusetts v. EPA foreclosed this argument by 
holding that the EPA’s failure to regulate United States 
automobile emissions which contribute to global warning was 
redressable because even of the remedy sought would not “by 
itself reverse global warming,” but would “slow or reduce it.”61  
Likewise, the court reasoned, reducing upwards of 2.5 percent of 
total man-made carbon dioxide emissions would slow or reduce 
the effects of global warming, and concluded the injury claimed 
was redressable through the remedy sought, reduction of 
defendants’ emissions.62 
II.  JUDICIAL CREATION OF EMISSIONS STANDARDS IS EITHER TOO 
INSUBSTANTIAL TO CONFER ARTICLE III STANDING OR SO 
PERVASIVE AS TO RUN AFOUL OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE 
The Second Circuit in American Electric Power Co. found 
itself in an impossible position.  The court was forced to try and 
delicately avoid the political question doctrine by attempting to 
describe its holding as narrow and independent of any initial 
policy determination regarding balancing environmental and 
economic interests of United States carbon dioxide emitters, 
while at the same time making clear that its decision would 
redress the claimed injuries and future injuries caused by global 
warming.  As is apparent from the court’s decision, this balance 
cannot adequately be struck.  
the parens patriae analysis, also had standing, making the traditional standing analysis 
relevant regardless of the final answer on parens patriae standing requirements. 
 59 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347 (quoting Jana-Rock Const., Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 60 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347. 
 61 Id. at 348 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)). 
 62 Id. at 349. 
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A. In Order to Meaningfully Redress Injuries Caused by Global 
Warming, a Unified, Widespread Emissions Reduction Policy 
is Needed. 
In order for a litigant to have standing to pursue a claim, 
that litigant must show that she suffered an injury in fact caused 
by the complained of conduct that would be redressable by the 
relief requested from the court.63  There must be “a substantial 
likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury 
in fact.”64  “[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement 
when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete 
injury to himself.  He need not show that a favorable decision will 
relieve his every injury.”65 
Global warming and its consequences are an environmental 
problem different than any the judicial branch has previously 
dealt with.66  As noted above, the Second Circuit justified its 
conclusion that the judicial branch was suited to adjudicate this 
kind of dispute and could redress the injuries claimed in this case 
in large part on the fact that courts had previously resolved 
“complex” environmental problems, including various cases 
involving the effects of pollution.67  These pollution cases include 
the dumping of sewage into a river, 68  noxious fumes from a 
factory damaging nearby crops and forests,69 and the dumping of 
garbage into the ocean, which washed up on the shores of a 
neighboring state.70 
However, these examples all involved a specific act of 
pollution directly damaging a protectable interest.  If sewage 
going into a river is damaging interests downstream, it seems 
simple enough to conclude that stopping the dumping will 
prevent the damage.  Global warming is unique in that it does 
not fit this model. 
Global warming is a global problem.  While an individual 
emitter of carbon dioxide is undoubtedly contributing to the 
problem on some level, any individual contribution is likely so 
minimal as to have no measurable effect in terms of the injury 
causing consequences such as warming and sea level rise.  The 
 63 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 64 Jana-Rock Const. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 65 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982). 
 66 See, e.g., infra note 71. 
 67 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326–27. 
 68 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
 69 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 
237 U.S. 474 (1915). 
 70 New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded in its 
Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report that even if every 
developed nation in the world reduced its emissions by 2 percent 
per year from 2000 through 2010, global warming and sea level 
rise would only be diminished by a “small amount” by the year 
2030. 71   Moreover, the 2007 Synthesis Report anticipates 
greenhouse gas increases of 25–90 percent between 2000 and 
2030 absent mitigation efforts. 72   As further evidence of 
recognition of the insufficiency of a one-time 2.5 percent (or less) 
reduction, it should be noted that the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2009 (commonly referred to as the Waxman-
Markey bill) recently passed by the House of Representatives 
with a competing bill expected sometime in the near future from 
the Senate, calls for an 83 percent reduction from 2005 levels in 
all domestic carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.73 
Imagine, then, reducing not the emissions of every developed 
nation in the world, but instead allowing the emissions of all 
developed and developing nations to go unchecked and continue 
to grow while reducing only the emissions from six discrete 
companies within the United States.  Clearly, some greater 
scheme than this is required to have any measurable impact on 
global warming or sea level rise, the factors causing the injuries 
complained of in American Electric Power Co. 
In attempting to avoid this problem, the court in American 
Electric Power Co. brushed aside the issue of redressability, 
holding that Massachusetts v. EPA foreclosed the argument that 
the impact of emissions regulations could be too insignificant to 
redress injuries stemming from those emissions.74  However, the 
facts in Massachusetts are substantially different than the issue 
facing the court in American Electric Power Co. 
To begin with, Massachusetts concerned not the judicial 
branch imposing specific limitations on select energy producers, 
but rather whether the EPA had an obligation to regulate 
emissions from motor vehicles across the entire United States.75  
It has been estimated that United States motor vehicle emissions 
constitute upwards of 6 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide 
 71 THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2001 SYNTHESIS REPORT, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY QUESTION 6 98 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ 
ipcc_tar/vol4/english/pdf/q1to9.pdf. 
 72 THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 
 73 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 702 (2009). 
 74 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 349 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 75 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
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emissions contributing to global warming.76  Not only is this close 
to three times the amount of emissions directly at stake in the 
litigation in American Electric Power Co., but also the fact that 
the EPA was the defendant in Massachusetts rather than 
individual emitters is a critical distinction.  As the Supreme 
Court noted in Massachusetts: “Agencies, like legislatures, do not 
generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.  
They instead whittle away over time, refining their preferred 
approach as circumstances change and as they develop a more 
nuanced understanding of how best to proceed.”77 
In other words, the Supreme Court was acknowledging that 
even the impact of regulating all new automobiles in the United 
States was likely insufficient on its own to have a meaningful 
impact on the injuries caused by global warming, but recognized 
that the EPA, as the agency charged with implementing the 
Clean Air Act and regulating various emissions standards could, 
over time, design a comprehensive policy that would be 
substantial enough to make a dent in the effects of global 
warming.  It is in this context that the remaining language in the 
court’s opinion must be read. 
The court in American Electric Power Co. relied heavily 
(indeed, almost exclusively) on the Supreme Court’s language in 
Massachusetts that redressability was not defeated merely 
because the regulation of emission standards for new 
automobiles could not “by itself reverse global warming” because 
it could “slow or reduce it.”78  The American Electric Power Co. 
court found the emissions of the six energy producers analogous 
to the emissions of new motor vehicles across the United States.79  
However, the analogy does not hold when the Massachusetts 
language is taken in context. 
Where the EPA is the defendant rather than individual 
emitters, it follows that an initial step in creating a 
comprehensive policy might be sufficient to meet the Article III 
standing requirement of redressability.  The EPA was directed by 
Congress to create and implement climate change initiatives in 
 76 Id. at 1457–58.  See also U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2006 TOTAL 
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY, supra note 11 (showing 
that the United States produced approximately 20.3 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide 
emissions).  See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 2006 U.S. EMISSIONS 
INVENTORY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/emissions/downloads/08_ES.pdf (noting that 33 percent of U.S. man-made 
carbon dioxide emissions come from transportation activities, with 60 percent of 
transportation emissions coming from personal car use). 
 77 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1457. 
 78 Id. at 1458. 
 79 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 378. 
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order to successfully reduce the impact of global warming.80  In 
this manner, regulating new motor vehicle emissions would not 
completely alleviate the consequences of global warming, but it 
begins to “whittle away” at the overarching global problem.81  
Given that Congress directed the EPA to take action, it is 
perfectly conceivable that new motor vehicle emissions 
restrictions were just the first phase of a broader policy 
envisioned by Congress to be enacted over time, as the 
legislature “develop[s] a more nuanced understanding of how 
best to proceed” in tackling the imposing problem of global 
warming.82 
Judicial imposition of emission restrictions on individual 
emitters, by contrast, cannot be said to be the initial step in some 
larger comprehensive scheme.  Unlike the EPA, courts are not 
charged with creating an emissions reduction scheme.  While a 
single court decision directed toward individual emitters would 
reduce the amount of global emissions by some insignificant 
amount, that court cannot on its own take any future steps in 
order to continue to whittle away at the massive problem that is 
global warming.83 
Without the scenario presented in Massachusetts, where an 
agency is compelled by Congress to take the first step in creating 
a presumably broader emissions reduction policy, the 
independently insignificant act of requiring six individual 
emitters to reduce their emissions is insufficient to satisfy the 
redressability prong of the standing analysis.  Gone is the 
justification of “whittling away” at a larger problem by taking a 
small initial step.  All that remains is a single, independent 
remedy devoid of any practical significance that fails to redress 
the complained of injuries. 
Therefore, in order for the judicial branch to sufficiently 
redress an injury caused by global warming, that court (or 
multiple courts through piecemeal litigation directed at specific 
individual emitters) would have to enact a broad based emissions 
scheme sufficient to make some measureable impact on the 
ramifications of global warming.  There are two means by which 
this might be accomplished: (1) a single court (perhaps the 
Supreme Court) setting forth a uniform policy of emission 
 80 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
 81 See id.  See also supra notes 77 and 78. 
 82 See supra notes 77 and 78. 
 83 That is to say, courts are at the mercy of plaintiffs who bring disputes before them 
pursuant to the case or controversy requirement, and cannot independently pursue any 
sort of larger agenda, as could a legislative or authorized administrative body. U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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reductions for energy producers; or (2) gradual piecemeal 
litigation directed toward specific energy producers in multiple 
courts which eventually impose specific restrictions on all (or 
virtually all) major energy producers.  However, both of these 
methods are problematic, due to the political question doctrine, 
as discussed below. 
B. In Order to Enact a Sufficiently Widespread Emissions 
Reduction Scheme to Redress Injuries Caused by Global 
Warming, Courts Would Have to Resolve a Non-Justiciable 
Political Question 
“The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review 
those controversies which revolve around policy choices and 
value determinations constitutionally committed to the halls of 
Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” 84   The 
doctrine is “designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate 
interference in the business of the other branches of 
Government.” 85   In 1962, the Supreme Court set forth six 
categories of non-justiciable political questions (the Baker 
factors): 
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.86 
Should a court (or multiple courts, though a series of 
piecemeal litigation directed at specific energy producers) decide 
to create a uniform, across the board policy to avoid the 
redressability problem discussed above, it would run afoul of the 
political question doctrine under either the third87 or the fourth, 
fifth and sixth Baker factors88 depending on whether Congress 
has sufficiently expressed a policy on regulating energy producer 
 84 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
 85 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990). 
 86 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 87 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 88 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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emissions to date.  Notably, the creation of such a policy likely 
would not contravene the first Baker factor.89 
Arguably, Congress has already made an initial policy 
determination inconsistent with the judicial branch setting 
emission restrictions on domestic energy producers prior to a 
global agreement being reached.90  If this is the case, the judicial 
branch is precluded from setting emissions limitations before 
such an agreement is reached.  If, on the other hand, Congress 
has not sufficiently expressed such a policy on domestic energy 
producers, then an initial policy determination must be made.  
Courts are prohibited from making such a determination by the 
third Baker factor.91  In either case, the judiciary runs afoul of 
the political question doctrine under either the third or the 
fourth, fifth and sixth Baker factors, but not under the first 
Baker factor.92 
1.  If Congress Has Sufficiently Expressed a Policy on 
Regulating Emissions of Domestic Energy Producers, 
Judicial Intervention Establishing Such Standards 
Conflicts with that Policy in Violation of the Fourth, 
Fifth and Sixth Baker Factors 
The fourth, fifth and sixth Baker factors depend on the 
existence of a policy expressed by a coequal branch of 
government which would be contradicted by a court’s decision in 
a particular case.93  If such a policy is in existence, and the 
court’s decision would in some way undermine that policy, the 
court may be presented with a non-justiciable political question 
and be forced to refrain from issuing an opinion on the merits.94 
Arguably, Congress has already set forth a policy on 
regulating domestic emissions.  Congress is no stranger to the 
debate over global climate change policy.  In 1987, Congress 
enacted the Global Climate Act of 1987, which compelled the 
Secretary of State to engage in global negotiations on climate 
change on behalf of the United States.95  In 1992, the House of 
Representatives weighed whether to enact domestic emissions 
restrictions and specifically found that domestic emissions 
reduction action should only be taken “in the context of concerted 
 89 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 90 H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992); S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. 
(1997).  See also infra Part II.A.1. 
 91 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 92 See infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2. 
 93 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 331 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 94 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 95 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006). 
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international action.” 96   Through the negotiations authorized 
under the Global Climate Act of 1987, the United States entered, 
with ratification by the Senate, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was designed 
to achieve a global accord as to how to best handle climate 
change.97  The fruit of the UNFCCC was the Kyoto Protocol, 
which President Clinton signed in 1997, but was never presented 
to the Senate for ratification.98  Had the Kyoto Protocol been 
presented to the Senate, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests it 
would not have been ratified; also in 1997, the Senate passed a 
resolution with a 95-0 vote urging President Clinton not to sign 
any agreement that did not include emissions restrictions on 
developing nations, as the Kyoto Protocol failed to contain. 99  
Moreover, Congress subsequently “passed a series of bills that 
affirmatively barred the EPA from enforcing the [Kyoto] 
Protocol.”100  Based on the resolutions passed separately by each 
house of Congress, it appears reasonable to conclude that the 
primary objection to the Kyoto Protocol is that it failed to include 
a truly global agreement—that is, one that would include 
restrictions on both developed and developing nations. 
The reasoning that supports the United States refraining 
from enacting domestic emissions reductions prior to entering a 
true global agreement requiring other nations, including 
developing nations, to likewise reduce their emissions is centered 
around the United States’ bargaining power in negotiating such 
an agreement.101  Presumably, if the United States already had 
domestic restrictions on emissions in place, there would remain 
less to bargain with in convincing other nations to restrict their 
emissions. 
This rationale is particularly apt with respect to domestic 
energy production.  As of 2006, it was estimated that 
approximately 41 percent of the United States’ man-made carbon 
dioxide emissions come from energy production. 102   Moreover, 
global energy has been projected to increase 60 percent from 
2002 levels by 2030,103 underscoring the importance of energy 
production emissions to any global agreement.  If these 
 96 H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992). 
 97 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269. (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 98 Id. 
 99 S. RES. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 100 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 101 S. RES. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 102 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 2006 U.S. EMISSIONS INVENTORY, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 76, at 8. 
 103 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD OUTLOOK 2004, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 31 
(2004), http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2004SUM.pdf. 
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emissions, bound to be a major component of any comprehensive 
agreement, are restricted before the President sits down with the 
international community to negotiate a global solution, the 
concessions available for the President to offer (and hence, the 
concessions the President can seek in return) would be severely 
limited.  This is of particular concern with respect to India and 
China, who are rapidly ascending the list of largest global 
polluters 104  as well as assuming the role of major economic 
competitors with the United States.105 
If the 1992 House Report, 1997 Senate Resolution, and 
subsequent legislation by both houses of Congress preventing 
domestic enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol are sufficient to 
establish a policy that no comprehensive emission reduction 
scheme be enacted absent a global agreement requiring 
developing nations to likewise reduce their emissions, any court 
opinion or series of court opinions imposing mandatory emissions 
reductions would conflict with this policy.  Certainly, a court 
decision that directly contradicts an existing policy of the 
legislative branch would implicate the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
Baker factors and therefore contravene the political question 
doctrine.106 
However, the issue of whether Congress has expressed an 
official policy on global warming is far from settled.  Two major 
clouds hover, preventing clarity on this issue.  Specifically, (1) 
both houses of Congress have never come together to pass 
legislation explicitly setting forth this policy; and (2) Congress 
has passed other legislation authorizing emissions restrictions on 
certain industries.107 
The best evidence to date of Congress’ intention not to pass 
comprehensive domestic emissions restrictions until a global 
agreement is reached appears through a House Report and a 
Senate Resolution.108  However, as the Report and Resolution 
express only a non-binding opinion of one house of Congress and 
are not subject to a vote in the other house or any action by the 
President, it is difficult to conclude that any official policy has 
been set forth.  It seems the only information available confirms 
 104 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2006 TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY, supra note 11 (reporting that as of 2006, 
China and India were the first and fourth largest emitters, respectively). 
 105 James G. Neuger, G-8’s Dominance Faces Challenges from China, India, 
Bloomberg.com, July 10, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068 
&sid=aQlvD4kX5bE8. 
 106 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 107 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
 108 H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992); S. RES. 98, 105th Cong. 
(1997). 
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nothing more than that, as of 1992, the House of Representatives 
thought it unwise to enact comprehensive emissions reduction 
legislation absent a global agreement compelling developing 
nations to likewise reduce emissions to minimize the impact of 
global warming, and as of 1997 the Senate reached a similar 
consensus.109 
The court seized upon this absence of formal legislation 
setting forth a policy on emissions reduction in American 
Electric. Power Co.  As the court noted, “Congress’s mere refusal 
to legislate . . . falls far short of an expression of legislative intent 
to supplant the existing common law in that area.”110  The court 
went on to construe the common law doctrine of nuisance as the 
“existing common law” that Congress failed to supplant through 
legislative action.111  As the court eventually concluded, it seems 
that the fairest interpretation of the dual independent 
Resolutions is that they are insufficient to establish a national 
policy on emissions restrictions.112 
Moreover, Congress has passed legislation authorizing 
emissions regulation on other industries, specifically the auto 
industry.113  The Clean Air Act instructed the Environmental 
Protection Agency to implement restrictions on new motor 
vehicles to make them more environmentally friendly. 114   In 
2007, the Supreme Court interpreted the Clean Air Act as giving 
Congressional authorization to the E.P.A. to regulate carbon 
dioxide emissions from such new vehicles.115  Thus, Congress has 
in fact authorized the restriction of a major source of emissions116 
in some form without any qualification regarding a global 
agreement being reached first.  This cuts sharply against any 
contention that Congress has expressed a national policy to 
refrain from restricting emissions until a global agreement has 
been reached.  However, the Clean Air Act does not completely 
foreclose the argument that a policy exists favoring abstention 
from restrictions on the emissions of domestic energy producers, 
which account for a larger percentage of U.S. man made carbon 
 109 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 110 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 330 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 (1993)). 
 111 See id. at 331. 
 112 Id. at 331–32. 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007). 
 116 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 2006 U.S. EMISSIONS INVENTORY, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 76, at 8 (noting that 33 percent of U.S. man-made 
carbon dioxide emissions come from transportation activities). 
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dioxide than do motor vehicles,117 as the Clean Air Act does not 
mandate emissions restrictions of energy producers.118 
Notably, although a clear expression of a national policy in 
favor of refraining from enacting mandatory domestic emissions 
restrictions prior to a global agreement would simplify the 
analysis, judicial imposition of such restrictions would violate the 
political question doctrine regardless of the existence of such a 
policy, as discussed below. 
2.  If Congress Has Not Sufficiently Expressed a Policy on 
Regulating Emissions of Domestic Energy Producers, 
Judicial Intervention Establishing Such Standards 
Requires an Initial Policy Determination in Violation of 
the Third Baker Factor 
Even if the court in American Electric Power Co. was correct 
in deciding that no policy determination was made by Congress, 
judicial regulation of emissions violates the political question 
doctrine.  If no such policy was established by Congress, a court 
deciding to impose emissions restrictions would be required to 
make an “initial policy determination” in violation of the third 
Baker factor.119 
a.  Unlike Previous “Direct Pollution” Cases, Global 
Warming Requires the Balancing of Numerous 
Factors with Far Reaching Global Policy Implications 
In the context of water pollution, the Supreme Court held in 
1972 that, where existing laws and regulation did not encompass 
the specific environmental nuisance alleged by a plaintiff, that 
plaintiff was not required to wait for comprehensive legislation to 
be enacted specifically outlawing that nuisance in order to bring 
a suit for injunctive relief.120  Instead, the plaintiff could proceed 
with a common law nuisance action designed to halt the injurious 
conduct, despite the fact that future legislation may preempt the 
common law with respect to the particular nuisance.121  The court 
gave no suggestion of the need to make an initial policy 
determination in such a scenario. 
However, as referenced above, global climate change 
occupies a different realm than direct pollution cases.122  Global 
 117 Id. (noting that energy production accounts for more than 40 percent of U.S. man 
made carbon dioxide emissions, as compared with 33 percent created by transportation). 
 118 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
 119 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 120 Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972). 
 121 Id. at 107. 
 122 See supra Part II.A. 
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climate change is not nearly as cut and dry as water pollution, 
which involves a direct injury attributable to a particular source 
and would not ordinarily require the weighing of many complex 
factors in constructing a remedy.  Any relief sufficient to redress 
injuries and future injuries caused by global warming would 
require extended consideration of numerous incredibly complex 
factors.  As the District Court put it in its opinion in Connecticut 
v. American Electric Power Co.: 
Such relief would, at a minimum, require this Court to: (1) determine 
the appropriate level at which to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of 
these Defendants; (2) determine the appropriate percentage reduction 
to impose upon Defendants; (3) create a schedule to implement those 
reductions; (4) determine and balance the implications of such relief 
on the United States’ ongoing negotiations with other nations 
concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure available 
alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and balance the 
implications of such relief on the United States’ energy sufficiency and 
thus its national security—all without an “initial policy 
determination” having been made by the elected branches.123 
Certainly, as spelled out by the District Court, many complex 
decisions need to be made in order to set emissions restrictions.  
As an initial matter, a court would need to determine whether 
domestic emissions should be capped at all, or whether the 
economic detriment caused by setting such limits, especially 
before any global agreement has been reached, would be too 
great to warrant restricting emissions of domestic energy 
producers. 
The Second Circuit attempted to adjudicate around having to 
make an initial policy determination by casting the case before it 
as a simple nuisance action that required no policy 
considerations.124  Perhaps, in a vacuum, a court determining 
that six energy producers’ emissions contributed to damaging the 
interests of the plaintiffs could simply apply the common law 
doctrine of nuisance to determine whether injunctive relief was 
appropriate without any concern for overarching policy.  
However, as discussed above,125 in order for a court to be able to 
redress the grievances of such plaintiffs for purposes of Article III 
standing where the complained of conduct is a contribution to 
global warming, some broader-reaching decision (or series of 
decisions) is necessary to confer any meaningful relief on the 
 123 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
rev’d 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 124 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 331 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing 
the lawsuit as “an ordinary tort suit”). 
 125 See supra Parts I and II for further discussion. 
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plaintiffs.126  Any broader decision seems to require consideration 
of, at a minimum, the necessary policy determinations set forth 
by the District Court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
Co. 127   As the District Court emphatically and convincingly 
established, absent some initial policy determination from the 
executive or legislative branches, the judicial branch would be 
required to determine whether it is in the best interests of the 
United States to restrict emissions of its largest energy producers 
before other nations have agreed to respond in kind.128 
The wisdom of this far-reaching action would hinge on the 
delicate consideration of numerous complex global and domestic 
factors that are beyond the scope of question typically reserved 
for the judicial branch.  Such action would require the judicial 
branch to balance concerns including the need for global action in 
combating climate change and the degree to which restricting 
emissions on domestic energy producers without corresponding 
restrictions on foreign energy producers would handicap domestic 
economic interests.  This plainly goes far beyond routine 
application of longstanding nuisance principles that the Second 
Circuit asserted was all that it would be undertaking. 
b.  While Courts Have Previously Intervened in 
Politically Charged Issues, Even Those Courts 
Accused of Undertaking Judicial Activism Rarely, If 
Ever, Engage in Initial Policy Creation and 
Implementation 
It is beyond dispute that courts often weigh in, either 
explicitly or as a consequence of the decisions that they make, on 
certain policy issues.  However, the manner in which policy 
issues are influenced by the judiciary has historically largely 
been limited to decisions upholding, striking down or 
interpreting acts of the legislature.  For instance, examine the 
most significant cases of the courts that commentators often 
point to in identifying judicial activism.  Two periods of the 
Supreme Court’s history are continually identified as particularly 
“activist” periods in which the Court ventured into the realm of 
determining policy issues: The New Deal era and the Warren 
Court.129 
Before the New Deal era, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
declared legislative attempts to regulate worker rights, including 
 126 See supra Part II.A for further discussion. 
 127 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272–73. 
 128 Id. at 274. 
 129 See WOLL, supra note 20, at 220–29. 
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setting wage and hour requirements, unconstitutional, holding 
that such laws would impermissibly restrict the right to freedom 
of contract.130  Following the famed “Switch in Time that Saved 
Nine,” the Court suddenly began to uphold regulations setting 
maximum hours and minimum wages, overruling its previous 
precedents holding the opposite.131   The Court decided that 
freedom of contract was not absolute and could permissibly be 
restricted where the restriction would improve health and safety 
or protect vulnerable groups.132  In other words, the Court made 
a clear policy determination that freedom of contract should yield 
to worker protections where health and safety or vulnerable 
groups were concerned.  However, it should be noted that the 
legislature had already made this policy choice in enacting the 
health and safety oriented laws in the first place, and so there 
was nothing “initial” about any policy determination made by the 
Court in these instances. 
The Warren Court is likewise frequently cited as being an 
“activist” Court for its decisions striking down numerous laws 
harmful to minorities and other historically vulnerable groups.133  
The Warren Court is perhaps best known for striking down the 
“separate but equal” doctrine in schools through Brown v. Board 
of Education,134  predicated on the Court’s determination that 
separate educational facilities based on race were inherently 
unequal, and thus ran afoul of equal protection.  But even this 
decision was not setting any sort of initial policy.  Instead, it was 
a determination that the policy previously set forth via the equal 
protection guaranteed by the 14th Amendment was not being 
advanced through segregated education.  The Warren Court also 
recognized a constitutional right to privacy, which it held 
outweighed a state’s interest in prohibiting its citizens from 
using contraceptives in striking down such a law enacted by the 
State of Connecticut.135  While this could be considered a policy 
determination of sorts in some respects, the real policy being 
advanced by that decision is the Supremacy Clause—the Court in 
 130 E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down New York’s attempt 
to cap bakery workers’ hours at a maximum of 60 per week and 10 per day on grounds 
that such a law would impermissibly interfere with the right to freedom of contract). 
 131 E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (overruling Adkins 
v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and holding that freedom of contract was not 
absolute, and that the right to contract could be permissibly restricted where the 
restriction related to health and safety or protection of vulnerable groups). 
 132 See id. at 394. 
 133 Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why it 
Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 255 (2008) (noting that the Warren Court is “virtually 
synonymous with the term ‘judicial activism’”). 
 134 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 135 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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effect prohibited a state from enacting a law that, in the Court’s 
view, conflicted with the Constitution.  Advancement of such a 
policy did not require any “initial” policy determination by the 
Court, as the Supremacy Clause is of course written into the 
Constitution. 
Some of the Court’s brightest and most important moments 
have come amid accusations of judicial policy setting, including 
cases like Brown.136  By the same token, some of the Court’s 
lowest points, such as Korematsu v. United States, resulted from 
the Court’s failure to inject itself into politically charged 
issues.137  However, should the judicial branch be permitted to 
set far reaching emissions restriction policy, it would be taking a 
step beyond the purportedly “activist” decisions of The New Deal 
era or the Warren Court. 
As the District Court in Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power Co. correctly noted, the relief sought by the plaintiffs in 
that case would require the court to unilaterally set an 
appropriate level of emissions reduction as well as setting a 
schedule by which those reductions were to occur.138  Moreover, 
any policy sufficient to redress the injuries claimed by the 
plaintiffs would require, at a minimum, a broad-based decision 
(or series of decisions) setting restrictions on many (or all) 
domestic energy producers in order to make any measurable dent 
on the consequences of global warming complained of by the 
plaintiffs.139  In other words, contrary to the vehicles used by the 
Warren Court in eliminating “separate but equal” education, the 
judicial branch would not be simply evaluating actions taken by 
the elected officials of the legislative branch and making a 
decision to uphold or declare unconstitutional those actions.  
Instead, the judicial branch would be required to set forth, in the 
first instance, the policy options that should prevail in the 
ongoing debate on global warming and the mechanisms which 
should be implemented to achieve those policy goals. 
Consider an analogy to what the Warren Court would have 
had to undertake in Brown to match the largely legislative 
function that the judicial branch would have to assume in the 
global warming debate to determine the guiding policies for 
 136 Brown, 347 U.S. 483.  See generally Frank J. Macchiarola, Dorothy Kerzner 
Lipsky, & Alan Gartner, The Judicial System & Equality in Schooling, 23 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 567 (1996). 
 137 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the executive order mandating Japanese 
internment during World War II, specifically deferring to the determination made by 
Congress and the President that such measures were warranted). 
 138 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 139 See supra Part II.A. 
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emissions restrictions and implement the necessary changes in 
one fell swoop.  First, allowing the judiciary to determine that 
domestic energy producers should be subject to emissions 
restrictions without any legislative action setting forth this policy 
would be akin to the Warren Court creating the concept of equal 
protection on its own, rather than extracting it from the 14th 
Amendment.  There is no provision of legislatively enacted law to 
support such a decree from the judiciary at this point in time.  
Further, allowing the judiciary to set specific emissions 
restrictions on specific domestic energy producers to combat 
global warming would be the equivalent of the Supreme Court in 
Brown requiring that “Topeka High School A is to consist of no 
more than 70 percent white students, whereas Topeka High 
School B is to consist of no more than 60 percent white students, 
and Topeka High School C is to consist of no more than 65 
percent white students.” 
These, of course, were not the tactics taken by the Supreme 
Court in Brown.  Rather, after initially striking down segregated 
education as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause 
of the 14th Amendment, the Court set further hearing on the 
matter of how to implement the necessary changes. 140   The 
following year, the case came back to the Supreme Court in 
Brown II.141  In that case, the Court recognized that the judicial 
branch should not be charged with creating the programs to 
implement desegregation.142  Rather, the Court held that “[f]ull 
implementation of these constitutional principles may require 
solution of varied local school problems.  School authorities have 
the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving 
these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of 
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the 
governing constitutional principles.”143 
The Brown and Brown II Courts followed a traditional 
pattern of legislation and jurisprudence in the context of major 
policy change.144  First, a legislative body enacts a law.  Second, a 
plaintiff damaged by the law challenges its validity before the 
courts.  Third, the courts are charged with evaluating the 
validity of the law.  Fourth, the courts either uphold or invalidate 
the law.  Fifth, if the courts invalidate the law, they allow for the 
legislative branch (or if the legislative branch has delegated 
 140 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96. 
 141 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 142 See id. at 299–301. 
 143 Id. at 299. 
 144 All of the New Deal and Warren Court decisions cited previously likewise conform 
to this same traditional pattern. 
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rulemaking to an agency, that agency) to amend the scheme to 
bring it into compliance with the previously existing law, namely 
in Brown, the 14th Amendment. 
By contrast, judicial intervention into the global warming 
debate steps far outside this framework.  To date, no legislative 
body has acted to set emissions restrictions for domestic energy 
producers.  Rather, through cases like Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power Co., plaintiffs are attempting to fit an issue 
requiring widespread legislation into common law doctrines such 
as nuisance.145   As such, rather than being charged with 
evaluating the validity of a law enacted by the elected officials of 
the legislature, the judicial branch, should it intervene, is instead 
left to create not only its own policies, but also the mechanisms 
for enforcing those policies. 
In sum, the actions that would necessarily be undertaken by 
the judiciary should it intervene in the global warming debate 
and attempt to create its own set of emissions restrictions 
without allowing for the other coordinate branches of government 
to act would exceed the actions of even those courts long accused 
of “judicial activism.”  The courts would need to determine 
whether emissions restrictions should be imposed on domestic 
energy producers at all, and if so, such restrictions should be 
imposed prior to the creation of a global emissions reduction 
agreement and how the emissions restriction scheme should be 
structured.  These far reaching initial policy determinations that 
would be required of the judiciary are precisely what the third 
Baker factor is aimed to prevent, and so the political question 
doctrine precludes judicial intervention in this debate absent 
action by at least one of the other two branches of government. 
3.  Although Setting Emissions Restrictions Through the 
Judiciary Would Contravene the Political Question 
Doctrine as Set Forth Above, Judicial Branch 
Intervention in Setting Broad-Based Emissions 
Restrictions Would Not Directly Conflict with the 
Executive’s Constitutional Authority to Manage Foreign 
Relations, and So Would Not Violate the First Baker 
Factor 
The first Baker factor precludes a court from intervening in a 
dispute where the court’s decision would intrude on the 
constitutional authority of a coordinate political branch to act.146  
In the context of global warming, and the roundly recognized 
 145 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 146 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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need for a global agreement, the Constitution commits the right 
to negotiate and reach a global accord to the executive branch.147  
However, because judicial intervention in setting emissions 
restrictions would not directly interfere with the executive’s 
ability to negotiate and enter such an agreement, it would not 
contravene the first Baker factor despite arguments to the 
contrary from the plaintiffs in American Electric Power Co.148 
While the Second Circuit ultimately reached the correct 
conclusion in American Electric Power Co., holding that the first 
Baker factor would not be contravened by the court’s intervention 
in the global warming debate,149 its reasoning is unpersuasive.  
The court continually leaned upon the fact that courts have been 
adjudicating environmental disputes for over a century.150  This 
logic is insufficient to satisfy the real issues involving executive 
authority to manage foreign relations in the context of entering 
the dispute over global warming, as the issues presented by 
global warming are distinguishable from the direct pollution 
cases previously adjudicated by the courts. 
As noted above, the environmental disputes previously 
adjudicated by the judiciary involved discrete acts of pollution in 
well defined geographical areas—and not just any well defined 
geographical areas, but always domestic geographic areas. 151  
When a factory in Tennessee was emitting noxious fumes into 
Georgia causing damage to orchards and forests, the solution 
involved resolving only a single dispute between two domestic 
entities.152  Global warming and its consequences are different 
monsters altogether.  Analysis of injuries directly and 
immediately caused by actors and actions contained entirely 
within the United States shed little light on the propriety of 
judicial intervention in the worldwide problem of global 
warming.153 
Rather, global warming needs to be considered in the context 
in which it is agreed it must be addressed in order to be effective.  
Global change, not merely domestic change, is required.  It has 
long been the concern of Congress that enacting domestic 
 147 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). 
 148 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 325. 
 149 Id. at 325–26. 
 150 See, e.g., id. at 326–27. 
 151 E.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230 (1907); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); New Jersey v. City of 
New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). 
 152 Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230. 
 153 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change-Health and 
Environmental Effects: International Impacts, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/ 
international.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
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restrictions before a global agreement is reached could weaken 
United States bargaining power, especially with respect to the 
developing nations that are likely to see dramatic growth in the 
level of harmful emissions generated.154  Of particular concern 
are India and China, who are rapidly ascending the list of largest 
global polluters.155   In 1992, the House of Representatives 
specifically found that domestic emissions reduction requires 
should only be taken “in the context of concerted international 
action.”156 
However, as the court in American Electric Power Co. 
correctly noted, this is not the type of “direct challenge” to an 
action committed to another branch of government to which the 
first Baker factor applies.157  In the cases leading up to and cited 
by Baker as well as the cases decided in the four plus decades 
since Baker, courts finding the existence of a non-justiciable 
political question based on the first Baker factor have typically 
done so only where resolution of the case would preclude another 
branch of the government from undertaking an action 
constitutionally committed to it, such as a court decision 
recognizing a sovereign to the exclusion of the executive’s 
authority to do so or precluding the executive from dispatching 
troops overseas. 158   Contrary to these examples, judicial 
regulation of emissions created by domestic energy producers 
would not usurp the President’s authority to enter a global 
agreement.  While it would seem likely to reduce the President’s 
bargaining power in negotiating such an agreement, this is 
distinct from assigning to the courts a function constitutionally 
committed to one of the other branches of government. 
Because reduction in bargaining power in negotiating an 
international agreement is not sufficient to be considered a 
“direct challenge” to a function textually committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, the first Baker 
factor is not an impediment to judicial determination of 
 154 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Greenhouse Warming–Energy Implications (1992). 
 155 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2006 TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY, supra note 11 (reporting that, as of 2006, 
China and India were the first and fourth largest emitters, respectively). 
 156 H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Greenhouse Warming—Energy Implications (1992). 
 157 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 325 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 158 E.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (demonstrating a plaintiff’s 
attempt to challenge President’s determination that the Guano Islands were a territory of 
the United States presented a non-justiciable political question); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (stating that the attempted challenge to the President’s decision 
to deploy troops in a foreign nation was non-justiciable political question); Can v. United 
States, 14 F.3d 160, 162–63 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the court could not make 
determination of title to blocked South Vietnamese assets because it would preclude 
President’s authority to recognize foreign governments). 
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emissions restrictions, despite the argument to the contrary by 
the energy producer defendants in American Electric Power Co.159  
Rather, the problematic Baker factors are three, four, five and 
six, as set forth above.160 
C. The Solution is to Allow the Executive and/or Legislative 
Branches to Act Before the Judicial Branch Becomes 
Involved 
The above analysis concluding that the judicial branch 
should not be setting emissions restrictions on domestic energy 
producers is not to suggest that emissions from domestic energy 
producers cannot or should not be restricted, as certainly the vast 
majority of scientific evidence points to climate change as a real 
and serious problem with potentially devastating consequences.  
However, instead of the judicial branch setting emission 
standards either in one fell swoop or over time through piecemeal 
litigation against specific contributing entities, courts should 
refrain from entering the dispute until the executive reaches a 
global accord ratified by the legislature which the legislature 
passes laws or delegates the authority to enforce, or until the 
legislature makes clear that a national policy of emissions 
restrictions on domestic energy producers should be put in place 
even prior to a global agreement. 
Legislative action is precisely what occurred in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.161  In that case, multiple states relied on 
action taken by the legislative branch to attempt to compel the 
EPA to regulate new motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions.162  
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act and charged the EPA with 
designing mechanisms for its enforcement.163  The court was then 
left to assume its traditional role of interpreting the laws enacted 
by the legislature. 
However, as noted above, the Clean Air Act does not 
mandate restricting the carbon dioxide emissions of domestic 
energy producers.164  While there is a strong push for a global 
agreement emerging from the international community, few 
would say that a comprehensive global agreement to which the 
United States and other major emitters are likely to join is 
 159 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 at 324–25. 
 160 See Part II.B. 
 161 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 162 Id. 
 163 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
 164 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
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imminent.165  Unless and until some global agreement is reached, 
Congress would do well to make a determination as to which 
policy course to take: either pass legislation preventing further 
emissions restrictions until a global agreement is reached, or 
press forward with domestic regulation despite the lack of an 
international agreement. 
III.  HOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN CONNECTICUT V. 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. REMAINS USEFUL 
Although the Second Circuit’s opinion holding that the 
political question doctrine does not preclude courts from setting 
emissions restrictions on defendant energy producers under the 
common law nuisance doctrine should not withstand further 
scrutiny, it remains a useful opinion in the race to mitigate the 
consequences of global warming.  This is because, as the law 
currently stands (at least in the Second Circuit), the judicial 
branch can now seemingly unilaterally impose emissions 
restrictions on emitters of carbon dioxide without the influence of 
either of the other two branches of government.166  This is an 
undesirable scenario for many important players in the global 
climate change debate, and may help spur long awaited action by 
the executive and legislative branches. 
The energy lobby has long been accused of attempting to 
prevent, delay or at a minimum, assure the energy industry 
favorable terms in any comprehensive policy on climate 
change. 167   Energy companies have committed large sums of 
money to these causes.  For instance, The American Coalition for 
Clean Coal Electricity, an advocacy group consisting of 48 energy 
producers, mining companies,  and railroads, had committed 
$9.95 million to those ends as of March 2009.168   Energy 
producers routinely make large campaign contributions to high-
ranking members of Congressional committees charged with 
energy regulation and environmental action.  For example, one of 
the largest contributors during the 2009–2010 campaign cycle to 
Rep. Joe Barton, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy & 
 165 See Bryan Walsh, Climate Accord Suggests a Global Will, if Not a Way, Feb. 2, 
2010, TIME.COM, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1958234,00.html. 
 166 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 167 Public Health and Natural Resources: A Review of the Implementation of Our 
Environmental Laws:  Hearing Before S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong., 
2nd Sess., (2002) (testimony of Eric Shaeffer).  Shaeffer, the former director of the Office 
of Regulatory Enforcement at the EPA, testified that the “energy lobbyists . . . are 
working furiously to weaken” regulation of emissions created by energy producers. Id. 
 168 Wayne Berman, Energy Reform:  Heavy Hitters Seek to Sway Cap and Trade 
Debate, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/12/ 
heavy-hitters-sway-cap-and-trade/. 
Do Not Delete 4/14/2010 5:42 PM 
2010] A Catastrophic Conundrum, But Not a Nuisance 295 
Commerce, is none other than American Electric Power Co., the 
lead defendant in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.169  
The industries making the two largest contributions to Rep. 
Barton are the lectric utilities and oil & gas industries.170 
Given the aggressive attempts to influence climate change 
legislation that the energy lobby has demonstrated, an event 
causing energy producers to support emissions reduction 
legislation would be significant in making progress in this area.  
A decision authorizing piecemeal judicial regulation of emissions 
could be such an event. 
While the energy lobby has long resisted comprehensive 
emissions reduction policies, if such policies are to be initiated, it 
follows that energy producers would prefer they come from a 
source over which influence can be asserted to assure favorable 
terms.  A judicially created emissions restriction seems to be a 
worst case scenario for energy producers.  Unlike the political 
branches of government, the judiciary is intended to be beyond 
reproach by lobbyists.  Without the need for (or the ability to 
accept) political contributions, the influence that can be asserted 
over the judiciary should be markedly less than that over the 
legislative process in Congress.  The executive can be influenced 
in a similar manner, especially a first-term President needing 
cooperation on other major policy initiatives, including health 
care reform. 
However, with the potential for increased efforts by the 
energy lobby to assert legislative or executive driven policies on 
emissions reductions comes the increased risk that any such 
policy will be too favorable to energy producers, and 
correspondingly too lenient on emissions.  This has already 
proven to be an area for concern, as several notable pundits have 
criticized the Waxman-Markey bill on this basis.171  An increased 
focus from energy producers in achieving favorable terms could 
exacerbate this issue. 
While only time will tell the nature of the impact the Second 
Circuit’s decision in American Electric Power Co., the decision 
seems likely to shift the incentives for the energy industry 
toward encouraging some action by the legislature and/or the 
executive.  The optimal scenario would seem to be a global 
 169 Joe Barton, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/ 
summary.php?cid=N00005656&cycle=2010# (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
 170 Id. 
 171 E.g., Press Release, Rep. Dennis Kucinich, Passing a Weak Bill Today Gives Us 
Weak Environmental Policy Tomorrow, (June 25, 2009), available at 
http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134813. 
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accord, followed by legislative action to enforce the terms of that 
accord domestically.  The courts would then be restored to their 
customary role of adjudicating disputes over the meaning of the 
global accord and the subsequent legislation passed by Congress, 
rather than attempting to create policy in the first instance. 
CONCLUSION 
The time for significant new policy on climate change is now.  
Widespread, dramatic reductions are required in order to reduce 
the looming and potentially devastating consequences of global 
warming.  The judicial branch, along with the public, is rightfully 
growing frustrated with the lack of action both internationally 
and domestically.  The Second Circuit has boldly asserted itself 
as a decision-maker where Congress has been unwilling. 
However, despite the fact that the world can no longer afford 
to wait, the judicial branch is simply not the appropriate body to 
set forth the policies that will govern the global warming crisis 
going forward.  While the Second Circuit’s decision should not 
withstand further legal scrutiny, it may turn out to be an 
underappreciated hero on climate change. 
